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 THE AMBIVALENCE OF LEO STRAUSS’ 





The name and work of Leo Strauss (1899 -1973) have a long and well-
-deserved notoriety, though for reasons that are not consensual. A Jew 
born in Germany in 1899, and naturalized American, he began his aca-
demic career in the Weimar Republic. He studied philosophy, mathe-
matics, and natural science, following courses on various subjects. 
After working as a researcher at several Jewish institutes, he obtained 
a Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship in 1932 -1934 to research Thomas 
Hobbes’ philosophy in France and England. He departed to the United 
States in 1937, where he taught at the New School for Social Research 
in New York between 1938 and 1949. He enrolled at the University of 
Chicago from 1949 to 1967 where he taught classical political philoso-
phy, and he died in 1973.
Strauss’ books and articles about great authors of political philoso-
phy, such as Plato, Maimonides, Hobbes, and Spinoza disclosed him 
as an historian of political ideas and a critic of the crisis of the West. 
His intellectual trajectory goes along the neo -classical school of politi-
cal philosophy, with Eric Voegelin, Hannah Arendt, and Aaron Gur-
witch. Aware of the contemporary relativistic critique of reason and 
spirituality, he realized that positivism and historicism had devastating 
effects on social sciences. He was attuned to liberal democracy as a way 
of criticizing immanent ideologies. He stressed that the dignity of pol-
itics should be restored in the public space, as participation counts 
more than the discourse of those who are not engaged in the search for 
truth.
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Leo Strauss’ major work is coincident with the 50’s and 60’s when the 
USA was a beacon for the world (Wood, 1988). He championed the prin-
ciples of natural law for a society of free nations that took seriously equal-
ity, freedom and the right to happiness of men and women. (Strauss, 
1953, 1 -2) The Western global reverberation, Leo Strauss pointed out, 
resulted from convergences between ‘philosophy’, a synonymous of 
Greek rationalism, and ‘religion’, a synonymous of the law of Israel. 
Significantly, such a lessening of the Hellenic and Jewish legacies omitted 
philosophical enthusiasm, biblical prophecy and Christian hope.
Strauss’ rendering of the main tenets of Ancient philosophy weighs 
negatively on his purpose. Classical political philosophy accepted 
human inequality as a starting point: not all people have the same capac-
ity, neither all access the same resources. Modern liberalism, Strauss 
argues, establishes that everyone has the right to happiness and can cre-
ate and elect his own values; science must conquer the adversities of 
nature and put them at the service of human power. Both courses of 
thought are problematic: classical thinking runs the risk of traditionalism 
and cynicism; modern thinking incurs in the risks of relativism and fun-
damentalism. Many of the misconceptions in Leo Strauss’s thinking stem 
from his attempt to shift classical principles to contemporary societies 
whose genesis, development, and aspirations are very different from 
ancient societies.1
In “The Three Waves of Modernity” Strauss simplifies his diagnosis 
of the crisis in the West with a devastating critique. The first wave 
includes Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke; the second wave begins with 
Rousseau, and the third wave with Nietzsche and Heidegger. Together, 
they proclaimed ideas that paved the way for the evils of present day 
(Strauss, 1953, 81 -82).
Notwithstanding his critique of Heidegger and Nietzsche, Strauss 
is inspired by them. In his essay on Heidegger, he reveals a mixture of 
1 “We cannot reasonably expect that a fresh understanding of classical political philosophy will 
supply us with recipes for today’s use. For the relative success of modern political philosophy 
has brought into being a kind of society wholly unknown to the classics... Only we living today 
can possibly find a solution to the problems of today. But an adequate understanding of the 
principles as elaborated by the classics may be the indispensable starting point for an adequate 
analysis, to be achieved by us, of present -day society in its peculiar character, and for the wise 
application, to be achieved by us, of these principles to our tasks...” (Strauss, 1987, 73)
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admiration and contempt (Strauss, 1989). He considers him the greatest 
philosopher of his time as he understood the magnitude of the crisis 
of modern world and the decadence of Europe; yet, his recommended 
therapies are not up to his diagnosis. The best that Strauss says of Hei-
degger’s ethics is about anti -conformism: against the night of the world, 
Heidegger wants to be back to the original sense of existence that shone 
in the early Greek philosophers. However, by socializing the desire for 
authenticity in Being and Time, he transforms it into a collectivist ethics 
that surrenders to the Führer and embraces destiny; Heidegger’s infa-
mous political discourses of the Nazi era are an enlargement of this 
issue (Farias, 1989).
Strauss’ evaluation of Nietzsche also reveal an ambivalence. Strauss 
accepts the image of the blond beast as the Western man who lost Bibli-
cal morality through the embrace of nihilism and the return to barba-
rism; he has no place for the superman, the philosopher of the future 
who faces the responsibilities as a Caesar with the heart of Christ. Instead 
of Nietzsche’s raptures about tragedy and about the eternal return, 
Strauss heightens the fragments of the pre -Socratics and the classical 
philosophers as a beacon for rationalism and prudence which is much 
more conservative than Nietzsche’s proposals.
2. Modern and Classical political philosophy
According to Strauss, the crisis in the West has been exacerbated by the 
loss of confidence in natural law; politics is no longer governed by the 
rule of law. The Moderns considered unrealistic the classical apprecia-
tion of human virtues and rejected it as a utopia whose achievements 
would be improbable as it depended on fortune. Machiavelli for 
instance, instead of praising virtue and value to safeguard political 
order against the deficiencies of human nature, reduced the expecta-
tions of public space; to increase the achievement of the political goals 
of the Prince, he lowered the promise of politics. Classical political phi-
losophy subordinated politics to moral and intellectual virtues. Mach-
iavelli, instead, subordinated virtue to power and held the desire for 
glory as a substitute for morality. In Machiavelli Strauss ponders that 
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the Florentine reacted against the inhumanity of the Catholic Inquisi-
tion, provoked by impossible goals of perfection such as the human 
aspiration for eternity. At the same time, Machiavelli appropriated 
Christianity in a Gnostic way, as a form of propaganda that controls 
human thought (Strauss, 1959, 43 -46; Strauss, 1953, 177 -178).
The Straussian critique of Modern political philosophy is an antici-
pation for his recovery of Classical political philosophy. And the more 
Strauss analyzed the Ancients, the more he felt inclined to see overtures 
that he did not find in the Moderns. He contrasted the so -called erotic 
(longing) or zetethical (questioning) skepticism of the Socratic authors 
with the dogmatic skepticism of the Moderns. (Strauss, 1959, 116; 
Strauss, 1953, 73, 80, 121 -124, 145 -146, 163 -164, 169 -177, 201, 249). 
Consciousness of ignorance does not imply that “the real world” is 
unknowable and that we can only know the “apparent” world. The 
meaning of Socratic doubt is that we have an incomplete knowledge 
of the “nature of things” perceived by the senses and expressed in 
language. No speculation can decide whether our lives should be 
guided by human reason, or by a divine revelation of the Scriptures as 
poets and prophets know.
The modern assumptions criticized by Strauss are the conviction of 
automatic progress (historicism) and the radical separation of facts and 
values  (positivism); together, they produce a relativism that forbids to 
see the truth of ancient doctrines. As the crisis of the West resulted from 
the premises of historicism and positivism, Strauss endeavored to 
recover in Hellenic rationalism the original premises for the search of 
truth and virtue. Hellenic rationalism discovers in human existence a 
nature from which immutable principles can be deduced; this discov-
ery, yet, is not a dogmatic assumption; “being” and “being intelligible” 
are not synonymous with “being object” and “being predictable”; only 
wisdom can tell us the difference between these two formulae.
It is an apparent paradox that Leo Strauss insists on the study of the 
history of political ideas to counteract historicism. He considered, in a 
very conservative and misleading way, that we are living in an era of 
intellectual decline in which it is doubtful that we can learn anything 
from the past; thus, historical studies are indispensable to counteract 
oblivion. We must “think the thought” and explore its relation to the 
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world. However, such rejection of historicism is ambiguous, as he for-
gets that historiography allows us to enter another world and into the 
world of the other and to understand it from within, as John Yolton 
argued (Yolton, 1955).
The Straussian way of presenting political philosophy contrasts with 
prevailing proposals of his contemporaries, namely George H. Sabine 
(Sabine, 1961; Strauss, 1959, 227 -228.). Sabine argued that past polit-
ical theories can hardly be held as true because they include value 
judgments resulting from ancient traditions. Sabine’s intention of writ-
ing the history of Western political theory “from the point of view of social 
relativism” required a radical separation of facts and values. On the 
contrary, as Strauss writes in his first preface to the History of Political 
Philosophy (Strauss and Cropsey, 1987) “the issues raised by the political 
philosophy of the past are alive in our society” and they should be taken 
seriously in political science.
Strauss, thus, held that Classical authors hold permanent truths. He 
refused to consider them as reflections of the time in which they lived, 
and to derive their thought from external causes: he wanted to keep 
alive their sense of questioning; it would be “safer to try to understand 
the inferior in function of the superior than the superior in function of the 
inferior”. There was a heavy price to pay for this resolution: understand-
ing contemporary anthropological, economic and political issues in the 
light of the classics, causes a loss of attention for novelty and for the 
perennial renovation of the promise of politics.
We may safely affirm that Strauss admired classical political philos-
ophy, not the classical polis. As he attempts to revive the flame of the 
ancient concepts of citizenship and polis, he has no nostalgia for the 
old polis and its “active life”, “public space” or “sense of community”. 
He had in mind Thucydides’ analysis of Pericles’ Funeral Prayer and 
the barbarities of Athenian imperialism, as patent in the Melos dia-
logue. He knows that Socrates extols the “good people” (kalois kagathoi), 
the educated and leisure minority dedicated to moral and intellectual 
virtues; he also knows that only a few achieve this status. He does not 
hope the prudent to play a big role in the community. Typically, the 
Socratic political voice will be a voice of loyal and prudent opposition, 
exactly as Strauss did.
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Strauss encourages his disciples to examine the texts of political the-
ory in the original and not to worry too much about the context. This 
lack of concern for the context leads him to unfounded generalizations, 
particularly the distinction between what the Classics affirmed in spe-
cific circumstances – through exoteric writing – and what they silenced 
as political truth in any time or place – the so called esoteric teaching.
Strauss did not invent this distinction; he recovered an already 
known device. He began to examine it in his doctoral thesis on Spinoza, 
which he considered a secret adept of assimilationist democracy and 
of political Zionism (Strauss, 1930). Then, he went back to Maimonides, 
whom Spinoza considered the best representative of Jewish theology; 
and then to Al -Farabi, whom Maimonides considered a philosophical 
authority; and finally to Plato, the common master of Al -Farabi and 
Maimonides. He believed that all these philosophers used esoteric 
modes of communication. “The most obvious and crude reason” was to 
protect themselves from persecution.
The risks of persecution – analyzed in (Strauss, 1952, 157 -158) – are 
obvious in tyrannies and Strauss was against tyrannies; the stimulating 
point is that, according to him, persecution persist in liberal regimes 
because philosophy is subversive. Philosophy, according to Strauss, is 
the “conscious, coherent, and incessant attempt to substitute opinions about 
the foundations by knowledge”; philosophy questions any dogmatic 
behavior that society demands from its members. As the disruption 
created by philosophy frees the human spirit from preconceptions, so 
the social sciences should free themselves from the negative conse-
quences of historicism and positivism.
Strauss believes that human concerns are not resolved with the pro-
nouncements of religious authorities. He invokes the dialogues of 
Socrates at Delphi, and of Maimonides in the Guide for the Perplexed as 
proof of his agnostic principles. Oracles and Scriptures require a human 
interpretation, and interpreters disagree according to the divinities and 
the codes they observe. Theological conflicts between religious author-
ities are conflicts between moral systems and between political regimes 
abiding by different conceptions of justice. Any theological question, 
as Spinoza asserted, may become a theological -political issue related 
to justice (Strauss, 1965, 7 -31).
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Divergences between the political regimes’ morality and divine 
commandments led the Sophists to the conclusion that the claims of 
popular religion about gods, justice and nobility were conventional 
opinions. The Greek political philosophers put aside the oratory of the 
political leaders and concentrated on the meaning of political order. 
According to Strauss, they concluded that each community has a group 
that exploits and governs and a majority that is exploited and gov-
erned. This universal condition of domination is a consequence of the 
unequal distribution of goods in society. Material goods are scarce; each 
one is concerned about his social promotion; glory is hard to reach. 
These harsh social realities belittle any extant beautiful statements 
about the nobility of fraternity, civic sacrifice, and service to the com-
munity. Sophists like Thrasymachus held them as illusions created by 
the powerful to justify themselves and to exploit the ruled; justice is 
the dictate of power (Strauss, 1953, 93 -113, 126). As for the pre -Socratic 
philosophers, they took refuge in the pleasure of thinking and lived on 
the margins of society the best possible life (Strauss, 1953, 10 -12, 114-
-117).
The Socratic dialogues, presented by Xenophon and by Plato, oppose 
such arguments of Sophists and of traditionalists. The dialogues are a 
friendly dispute that listens to the arguments of citizens whose life in 
the public space is very different from what Sophists claim (Strauss, 
1953, 120 -126). People disclose a natural sociability in political life; 
they show a need for sharing and affection, for mutual interests and 
sympathies that point to the existence of a common good. Selfish inter-
est is not everything and human sociability is richer than the instinct 
of the hive and the herd. Competition for superiority and prestige is 
undeniable, but between the opacity of interests shines a proper and 
fragile dimension of politics, the desire for a better world. (Strauss, 
1953, 129 -130; Strauss, 1991, 213 -214)
Even in the most intense political conflict, Socrates tells us, there is 
an awareness of the bounds of action as humanity tries to overcome 
threats and scarcity. These bounds are often violated – in war, in social 
conflict, in natural disasters – but even the attempt to disguise the 
violations is a sign that natural law exists. Men admire worldly success 
but also the moral qualities that restrains it. If natural law qualities are 
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promoted as goals of human action, a sense of community is created 
and it is possible to aspire for noble deeds; there will be heroes not only 
in war but also in peace (Strauss, 1953, 128 -135; Strauss, 1991, 205; 
Strauss 1959, 86, 89 -90, 111).
When we consider models of human action, some seem preferable 
to others. We appreciate virtues such as courage or virtue of the war-
rior; we appreciate moderation in economics; and generosity and 
patronage of the arts, and common pride, wit and friendship. These 
civic virtues should guide public life, they should form the substance 
of public space, argued Socrates and Strauss. That is the essence of 
citizenship that goes beyond the well -being of the body.
Socratic dialogues do not designate what is lawful by nature as a 
code of universal rules – as it will later happen with the formulas of 
Justinian law; they point to a scale of objectives that confer joy and 
satisfaction, when they are achieved (Strauss,1953,140 -143, 162 -164, 
193 -194; Strauss, 1959, 80 -87, 89 -91). Natural Law developed as a 
summary of these objectives: it does not fall from heaven and that is 
why it is a created law; neither is a pure human invention and that is 
why it is natural.
We should be aware of both greatness and misery in public space, 
concealed by sophists and opportunists. Researching the qualities of 
character discloses justice and nobility in the human heart, even though 
it may not triumph. Virtue is the key to personal happiness. Virtue 
shines more when it implies martyrdom, a tragic dimension of virtue 
that requires divine recognition (Strauss, 1953, 128 -129, 133 -134; Strauss, 
1991, 109, 147 -150, 161 -163). The enigmas of responsibility, guilt, and 
punishment present in tragic action (Oedipus, Antigone, Bacchantes) dis-
close that there is a higher sphere of existence, beyond politics: civic 
virtues are not the culmination of human life. Life in public space cul-
minates in the Socratic love of wisdom (Strauss, 1953, 140 -146, 149 -152, 
156, 157; Strauss, 1958, 13 -14, 19; Strauss, 1959, 29 -33, 90 -94).
According to Strauss, political regime (politeia) should be the basic 
category for the analysis of social realities. The questions to ask and the 
criteria for selecting data should be more practical than theoretical; 
political science should start from the ongoing discussions in each 
regime and between regimes. The objective is to evaluate positions, and 
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to conduct the reasoning until clarifying and arbitrating the implica-
tions of the used notions. Quantitative methods should play a subor-
dinate role. Political science should lose the obsession of making 
predictions, based on pseudo -universal laws and abstract models; in 
politics, almost everything is unpredictable. Political science should 
devote itself to the analysis of deliberation issues, providing elements 
for validating principles implied in decisions. Political scientists should 
focus less on the characteristics of justice, defense, finance or diplomacy 
and give priority to moral goals that give meaning to public space, i.e., 
values  of humanity about what the best regime is (Strauss, 1953, 191-
-194; Strauss, 1958, 205 -215; Strauss, 1959, 14 -17, 27 -29, 78 -95).
The best regime, according to the classical political tradition, is a 
mixed republic, Strauss tell us. Plato’s Laws and Aristotle’s Politics indi-
cate how the philosopher acts as a referee, attempting to moderate the 
claims of the majority of poor people and the minority of rich people, 
craftsmen, soldiers, merchants, laborers, and farmers. All classes and 
parties should share political responsibility by exercising their virtues 
and repressing their vices. The “excellent” ones (kaloi kagathoi) who 
dedicate themselves to moral virtues and enjoy the contemplative life 
will always be a minority; the menace of despotism is looming. The 
Socratic voice will be a voice of opposition and criticism against the 
acquisition of money in oligarchies; against blind obedience to tradition 
in theocracies; against dictatorship in military regimes; against egali-
tarianism and degenerate liberty in democracies. Each regime and each 
party sees the evils of their opponents but does not want to see its own 
excesses and errors (Strauss, 1953, 138 -143; Strauss, 1958, 14 -15; Strauss 
1959, 80 -81, 85 -90).
3. Debates and opponents
Strauss considered the history of political philosophy as a component 
of liberal education, a conversation among brilliant minds in great 
books that evoke human excellence and greatness. Against the syn-
drome that Tocqueville characterized as the new “tyranny of the major-
ity” – the pressure of conformity that checks the individual from 
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resisting public opinion – Strauss saw only one answer: “liberal educa-
tion is the antidote against mass culture” as we try to rise from mass 
democracy to original democracy, i.e., “an aristocracy broadened into uni-
versal aristocracy.” (Strauss, 1958, 4 -5, 24 -25; Strauss, 1953, 1 -4)
The liberal university should resist the pressures of society to 
endorse any politically correct dogma. (Strauss, 1958, 3 -25, 53 -54, 262). 
The threat to the idea of  university is the most acute manifestation of 
a threat to freedom of thought, enduring in modern liberalism: the 
opening of society contains a self -destructive germ. Liberalism has a 
noble facet of resistance to persecution and discrimination. However, 
democratic tolerance tends to degenerate into a relativism that all 
viewpoints have the same value; then comes the misleading judgment 
that whoever upholds the superiority of a moral view is ‘elitist’, 
undemocratic, and therefore immoral. As the leveling moralism 
degrades the sense of social justice demanded by political philosophy, 
virtue and wisdom are suspended and human beings may lose the 
opportunity to a fair degree in the hierarchy of talents and accom-
plishments.
Leo Strauss presented his teachings as an attempt to adapt and 
apply the Socratic tradition to the circumstances of our time. As shown 
by the context of his life –he went through the great crises of the 20thcen-
tury – we must examine them is a richer and broader context. He 
reached maturity in the German Weimar republic, and sought refuge 
and protection in the United States against the ominous Nazi regime. 
He became a firm advocate and a friend – without flattery – of democ-
racy. He insisted on a version of the Greco -Roman ideal of active citi-
zenship, imbued with the demand for moral government; he did not 
accept to reduce the arguments of citizens and rulers to an ideological 
surface masking economic benefits; he did not accept that political the-
ory assumed political deliberations as masks and illusions for the 
masses. Such suspicion undermines the already precarious respect in 
political debate and falsifies the human reality.
Against the winds and tides of the politically correct, Strauss was a 
major contributor for a new political philosophy in the 50’s and 60’s 
(Strauss, 1958, 3 -25, 53 -54, 262). A political scientist must begin by 
what he hears in common sense. He must use common language, rather 
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than inventing a theoretical jargon. He should be not relativistic, i.e., 
neutral in relation to values; nor should he adopt an ideological set of 
mind; he must transcend common sense, without losing sight of the 
involvement in public life.
In Natural Right and History (1953) Strauss criticized the axiologically 
neutral social sciences. If political science abstains from indicating the 
best public policies, public space surrenders to a lack of ethics, to irre-
sponsibility and will of power. The enemies of natural law, according 
to Strauss, are positivism and historicism. Its three highest represent-
atives are Machiavelli and Machiavellianism; Hegel and Statism; and 
Nietzsche and tribalism. In Strauss’s view, Hitler is an example of how 
these three evils, an inverted trinity, came together, causing the horrible 
convulsions of the 20th century.
Leo Strauss felt a special duty in confronting orthodox Marxists like 
Georg Lukács and M. C. Macpherson and maintained debates with 
Alexander Kojève on the roots of the Marxist thought. At the political 
or practical level, Strauss agrees with intelligent Marxists who know 
and show the limitations of the liberal -democratic values: Strauss 
accepts criticisms of consumerism, of relativist morality, and of the 
illusion of a value -free social science. However, he rejects the Marxist 
social goal of banal happiness after the revolution, like Nietzsche’s 
view of the society of the “last men” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Pream-
ble, V. Moreover, Marxism, like its opponent Nietzsche, underestimates 
the values  of compassion and civility as it does not set institutional 
boundaries against the abuse of power. It was not by chance that Marx-
ism created a new type of despotism in the 20th century before disap-
pearing in 1989 – a revolution that Strauss no longer attended.
Theoretically, Marxists did not understood that social life holds a 
fundamental tension between the need for answers and the need for 
questioning: society requires politicized thinking, political doctrines 
and party programs; but society also needs radical and independent 
questioning without compromise with a social imperative, except the 
imperative to know the truth. Societies need the quest for truth as much 
as people need the air they breathe. However, this genuine rationalism 
– the purpose of philosophy –  should not be a direct basis of any regime, 
as ideologies claim.
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As Strauss believes that modern democracy is threatened by the lack 
of virtues and that social sciences are not pitted against the crisis, we 
should ask what his alternative is. Max Weber’s radical distinction 
between facts and values  is no longer tenable; it is accepted because it 
coincides with egalitarian relativism, the simplistic form of democratic 
moralism. Again: what is alternative? Strauss’s peculiar interpretation 
of Plato displays a philosopher removed from everyday politics and 
conforming only externally to the regime of Athens (Strauss, 1987, 
33 -89). Plato wanted philosophy communicated in an esoteric way 
because, unlike religion, it is destined to a minority and its subversive 
role can lead ordinary people to nihilism and society to disorder; phi-
losophy justifies a “noble lie”. Strauss’ ambivalence is obvious again: 
he did not understand that the “noble lie” fulfills the role of an inspir-
ing myth, as in the formula of Plato in The Republic, 414a -415a: “You who 
are part of the city, you are all brothers.” Strauss apparently does not share 
this aspiration for human fraternity. Similarly, Strauss’ rigid separation 
between excellence -seeking rulers and ruled people extinguishes the 
notion of participation in public space. “Reserve of knowledge”, “use-
ful lie” and the radical separation between the philosopher and the 
politician are ideas rooted in neoconservative thought.
We are thus back to Leo Strauss’s central dilemma about public 
space: natural law should be the universal rule of human action but 
mass morality causes its forgetfulness and brings the relativization of 
moral and political standards. Strauss does not want power to impose 
what is right but his political alternative forgets the enthusiasm for a 
better society. Leo Strauss sometimes appears as someone who stands 
as a faithless man sorrowful that his contemporaries have lost faith. 
His Jewish legacy is clearly rabbinical and not prophetic neither open 
to a Christian matrix.
4. The Jewish question
The Jewish question was a wide -ranging debate in 19th and 20th century 
European society, regarding the appropriate status and treatment of 
Jews in society. According to Strauss, the Jewish question, “the most 
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evident symbol of the human problem as a social or political problem” exem-
plified the crisis of the West and of the liberal democracy. As humanity 
is divided into antagonistic groups, liberal society offered equality to 
Jews in the private sphere, argues Strauss, but with no guarantees 
against anti -Jewish sentiment and consequent social inequality. The 
assimilation of Jews deprived them of the respect that results from 
loyalty to tradition. Those liberal policies were superseded by the “final 
solution” that resulted from the destruction of the liberal state by 
National Socialism and Communism. Zionism, which Strauss sup-
ported as a young man, offers Jews a secular state of their own, but 
without Jewish culture and content.
In Why we remain Jews? Strauss indicates bluntly that the Jewish 
question has no solution. Persecutions, Crusades, Inquisition, and con-
centration camps always arise just around the corner. In the 20th cen-
tury, the Nazis reached the pinnacle of extermination, after decades of 
propaganda that the Jews were cosmopolitan, capitalist and agnostic, 
and enemies of everything German, traditional and religious. So why 
stay Jewish, asks Strauss? He echoes Theodor Herzl’s statement by 
saying “the enemy converts us into a nation, whether we like it or not.” 
(Deutsch, 1994)
The Jewish question manifests a tension between human reason and 
divine revelation, the rival claims of Athens and Jerusalem. This ten-
sion is “the nucleus, the nerve of intellectual history and the spiritual history 
of the West” and “the secret of the vitality of Western civilization.” Strauss 
denies that modern philosophy has settled this creative tension; the 
efforts of atheism only tarnished the Socratic consciousness of igno-
rance, which is the starting point of philosophy.
Strauss is a specialist in Jewish thought, but his reverence for Juda-
ism is scarce. Unlike authors as different as Paul, Thomas Aquinas and 
Lessing who present the Scriptures as the history of the education of 
humanity by God, Strauss has little to say about the Old and New 
Testaments as adequate documents for distinct phases of humanity. 
When examining the Middle Age works of Al Farabi, Averroes and 
Maimonides, Strauss’s writings reveal more about himself than about 
them. He shares with Maimonides his interest in the political advan-
tages of religion; social order is created through the religious 
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consecration of human authority. Strauss is scarcely concerned with 
the core of religious experience in mercy and redemption. Despite his 
dedicatory to Franz Rosenzweig of his first book, The Critique of Religion 
in Spinoza, he largely ignores the dialogical thinking of this  master.
Strauss’ blindness to the redemptive and dialogical thought and his 
focus on the rabbinical understanding of the law illuminates his disin-
terest in Christian political philosophy. Neither Augustine nor Thomas 
Aquinas aroused his interest and he does not consider 20th century 
thinkers such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Karl Löwith, Henri Bergson, 
Emmanuel Mounier, and Jacques Maritain. This omission of the Chris-
tian philosophy of human rights as an evolution of natural law makes 
Leo Strauss’s thinking vulnerable to neoconservative ideological 
appropriations (Gruchy, 1996).
5. Criticism and Posterity
Leo Strauss continues to be lavishly praised for his return to the clas-
sics, and diabolically accused of being dogmatic, conservative and 
Machiavellian. His work has influenced authors such as Alexandre 
Kojève, M. C. Macpherson, Raymond Aron, Eric Voegelin and Hans-
-Georg Gadamer (Pangle, 2006, ix -xi). We may even speak of a Straus-
sian style of research through concepts and presuppositions that 
influenced the teaching of political philosophy and the positions of 
intellectuals and political activists. The style suggests reading the 
so -called “great books” in order to understand a thinker “as he under-
stood himself” without concern for historical context.
Leo Strauss’ achievements attracted apologists and critics of assorted 
intellectual caliber. Among the apologists are Allan Bloom, Thomas 
Pangle and Joseph Cropsey. A noteworthy censor is Shadia Drury. The 
Political Ideas of Leo Strauss (Drury, 1988) and Leo Strauss and the Amer-
ican Right (Drury, 1997) are a ruthless criticism of Strauss as an anti-
-liberal author inspired by Nietzsche, Heidegger and Carl Schmitt. 
Drury largely ignores the Straussian legacy of natural law and recreates 
Strauss as a master of the conservative movement in the USA, parti-
cularly the Republican party. He is presented as the mentor of authors 
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such as Alan Bloom, Irving Kristol, Gertrude Himmelfarb, William 
Kristol, Clarence Thomas and Newt Gingrich who influenced the con-
servative revolution since 1980 when Ronald Reagan became president, 
a movement that reached the peak with the neo -conservatives around 
George W. Bush (Minowitz, 2009).
Media journalists took up Drury’s analysis. In 2003, James Atlas in 
the New York Times linked Leo Strauss and neoconservative politicians 
such as Paul D. Wolfowitz. Michael Ledeen, Stephen Cambone, Abram 
Shulsky, Richard Perle, Newt Gingrich, Elliott Abrams and editorialists 
such as George Will and Robert Kagan. Atlas used a typical fallacy: if 
some disciples of Strauss are neoconservative, then Strauss is a neoconserv-
ative. Indeed, these people were bad disciples that manipulated Leo 
Strauss’s theses. They forgot that the purpose of philosophy – the desire 
to “get out of the cave” – cannot be converted into a direct foundation 
of a political regime.
Classical political theory requires virtues, i.e., objectively desirable 
character qualities which provide greater personal and public happi-
ness. Neo -classical political theorists such as Hannah Arendt, Leo 
Strauss and Eric Voegelin lamented the decline of this idea among rul-
ers and citizens and they sought to debate political issues rather in the 
quality of individual experience in which public life unfolds and not 
through abstractions such as freedoms, rights and income. As Arendt 
wrote: “to understand politics in the sense of the polis is the only genuinely 
human action (Arendt, 1958, 76).
It is not too difficult to understand why Leo Strauss’ thought is more 
apt to be appropriated by neoconservative activists than by social dem-
ocrats and liberals: his Jewish legacy is above all rabbinical with a 
resigned attitude towards the injustices and tragedies of life; he does 
not incorporate the prophetic message, neither the Christian matrix; 
his Nietzschean and Heideggerean legacy is a mistrust of modernity 
in which, supposedly, man came to be understood as a natural being 
who, by consent, submits to a sovereign for the pursuit of happiness 
and freedom.
Leo Strauss reacted to the crisis of modernity through the recovery 
of natural law, writing as a scholar rather than a political thinker. He 
assumed that most of those who call themselves philosophers are, after 
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all, methodical scholars, who only indirectly address the great themes 
of great thinkers, arguing over differences. (Strauss, 1989, 27 -46). In this 
self -restraint we find the authentic Leo Strauss and the origin of his 
ambivalence as a political thinker: if a metaphor is adequate to describe 
him, he knew how to flee from Egypt, the land of the dead (sheol), but 
he did not find the way to the Promised Land, towards which those 
who wish to live more fully are moving.
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